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REMARKS
ANNETTE L. NAZARETHt
Good morning. I'm delighted to be here to talk to you today.
I plan to focus my remarks on some of the significant market
structure issues the Commission is facing and the flexible regu-
latory approach we're taking to them. Before I begin, however, I
must remind you that my remarks represent my own views, and
not necessarily those of the Commission or my colleagues on the
staff.1
During my time as the Director of the Division of Market
Regulation, I have come to appreciate the experiences of Captain
Kirk of the Star Ship Enterprise: exploring strange, new, and
uncharted worlds and discovering new possibilities. Actually the
only real differences between us are that Kirk's experiences were
fictional and occurred once a week, while mine are real and occur
daily. Changes in our marketplace are occurring at breathtaking
speed, warp speed if you will, and while they pose no life and
death dilemmas, questions concerning market structure have a
real and immediate impact on the financial well being of our
securities markets.
Fortunately for us, the Securities Exchange Act was drafted
by people of vision, who understood that designing a securities
market to meet their needs and their vision of the future would
be too rigid.2 Does anyone here believe that they would have
t Director, Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.
1 The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims
responsibility for any private publications or statements by any of its employees.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Commission or the author's colleagues on the staff of the
Commission.
2 See DANIEL C. ROPER, 73D CONG., LETTER OF SUBMITTAL To PRESIDENT
ROOSEVELT VI (Comm. Print 1934). "[1It is... proposed to require the suggested
administrative agency to engage in the full and adequate collection of statistics
upon which to base its rules and regulations, with a flexible power to alter these
from time to time as a fuller knowledge may require." Id; see also COMMITTEE ON
STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION, 73D CONG., REPORT TO SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 6
(Comm. Print 1934) (stating Committee's belief that a flexible mechanism should be
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envisioned: electronic communications networks; on-line trading;
after-hours trading; global trading; or the myriad of other
changes that have occurred over the past 65 years? And even if
they had, could they then have designed a market structure that
addressed these technological changes and accommodated
further innovation? To the contrary, Congress had the foresight
to design a flexible regulatory structure that addressed the
pressing need of the nation-investor confidence. 3 Let's face it,
our markets are driven not by technology, but by investor
confidence, and as Chairman Levitt has observed and as the
Congress understood, once that confidence is lost it is not easily
regained.4 Investor confidence was the issue in 1934 and it is
the issue today. Fortunately, Congress saw the issue clearly and
mandated that the markets be allowed to develop on their own,
provided they were fair, orderly, and protected investors.
As the debate over the market structure of the future
continues, virtually every facet of our market structure is being
called into question. I firmly believe that while technology
makes it not only possible, but in many instances preferable, to
alter the way we apply the National Market System principles,
the principles themselves are as valid as ever. We simply cannot
set up to allow for unknown future issues). "Stock Exchanges... do not present a
static situation susceptible to fixed standards." Id.
3 See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 5 (1934) ("If investor confidence is to come
back to the benefit of exchanges and corporations alike, the law must advance...
the ordinary citizen.., has to trust others and cannot personally watch the
managers of all his interests ....").
4 See S. REP. No. 73-792, at 3-4 (1934) (discussing causes of the Great
Depression and concluding that "it is essential that the Federal Government adopt
measures which will enable it to stem the speculative tide whenever necessary");
Spencer Derek Klein, Note, Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and the
Calculus of Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 666 (1988) (stating that
along with other events surrounding the crash of 1929, the "disintegration of
investor confidence in the integrity of the securities markets provided the primary
impetus for federal regulation of securities transactions"); see also BARRY
ALEXANDER K. RIDER & H. LEIGH FRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING
6-7 (1979) (noting the importance of investor confidence in attracting capital from
international investors in addition to domestic investors); John J. Phelan, Jr., In
Pursuit of Insider Traders, BANKERS MAG., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 51 ("Shareholders'
participation is an act of faith in the system .... If that faith is lost or badly
shaken, then the system is at risk."); Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260, 264 (1968) ("A liquid stock
market presupposes public confidence which creates willingness to purchase shares.
Much of the difficulty in organizing capital markets in the less developed countries
arises from public distrust and reluctance to invest funds in such markets.").
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expect investors to remain confident in the inherent fairness of a
marketplace that does not promote competition, transparency,
price discovery, best execution, or efficiency. These principles
are not only valid, they are the very foundation of the securities
industry!5
Each of the five pillars is an integral element of a
comprehensive regulatory approach. In implementing these
objectives, the relevant issue for the Commission is never
whether to choose one objective to the exclusion of another, but
to facilitate the development of a market structure that
adequately incorporates and advances each of the five objectives.
The Commission's job is to promote a regulatory environment
that allows industry and technology to develop on their own,
consistent with the principles of the National Market System.
Quite clearly, any market system dictated by the government
would be obsolete before it was fully implemented.
The U.S. securities markets have developed remarkably well
since 1934 using this regulatory approach. Today, investors
have unprecedented access to information about securities and
the markets, and enjoy narrower spreads, lower execution costs,
and faster execution speeds.6 As we face today's challenges, I
believe there is consensus both at the Commission and in the
industry that this flexible framework will continue to serve us
well in the years ahead. There is no doubt that the securities
industry stands at an historic crossroad. Technology continues
to revolutionize our marketplace and much of our original
"plumbing," if you will, established after the National Market
System legislation, is in need of serious repair. The debate rages
on: should we patch or should we tear down and start anew?
Some major structural challenges that currently face us include:
our model of self-regulation; the linkage between market centers;
how market data is collected and disseminated; and
fragmentation of the marketplace. 7 These structural questions
5 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 10.13 (1985)
(discussing Congress' 1975 mandate of a national market system).
6 See infra note 9, at 70,845 ("Market participants have incorporated
technology into their businesses to provide investors with an increasing array of
services, and to furnished these services more efficiently, and often at lower
prices."); see also Electronic Traders Association Adopts Statement of Ethical
Principles for Member Firms, BUS. WIRE, July 29, 1999, at 321 (stating that
"[cihanges in technology allow individuals direct access to the securities markets").
7 See Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
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clearly focus the debate-patch or tear down? Regardless of our
decisions with respect to the future structure of our marketplace,
the foundation of our market structure-the core principles
enunciated by Congress in 1975 8-have amply demonstrated
their durability and merit in guiding the development of our
securities markets.
As you'll see from several of the examples I'm about to
discuss, the Commission recently has been experimenting with
some novel-and very flexible-regulatory approaches to
addressing some of the more complex market structure issues we
face today. In some cases, the Commission simply is setting the
regulatory goals, and then drawing upon industry expertise to
devise the means of achieving those goals.
Let's look at some of ways the National Market System prin-
ciples are now being tested.
I. MARKET CENTER COMPETITION
I'll begin with market center competition. Much of the
innovation in our marketplace today is due to competition.
Indeed, much of the success of our securities markets has been
achieved through the incentives created by multiple, competing
market centers.
In 1998, to promote market competition while recognizing
the role that electronic communications networks (ECNs) were
playing as new market centers, the Commission adopted
Regulation ATS. 9  Regulation ATS provides a streamlined
regulatory structure for ECNs that choose to be regulated as
alternative trading systems rather than national securities
exchanges, and thereby enhances the opportunity for innovative
market center competition. 10 Since the adoption of Regulation
ATS, the competition generated by ECNs has continued to
thrive, and we are making progress in integrating them into our
National Market System. Through their successful creation of
electronic agency trading venues, ECNs today account for
841, 917 (1999) (discussing whether linkages "between the open market and the
community market ... should be introduced").
8 See HAZEN, supra note 5 (outlining the core principals and the purpose and
goals of the 1975 Amendments).
9 See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg.
70,843F, 70,844 (Dec. 22, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 202, 240, 242, 249).
10 See id.
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approximately 30% of the share volume and 40% of the dollar
volume in NASDAQ stocks.'1
A significant market structure challenge facing us today is
how to level the playing field between ECNs and the SROs.
SROs, unlike ECNs, serve a unique self-regulatory function.
They have the power to discipline members. 12  They must
provide fair access to members and they must submit most rules
to the Commission for review. Many of the SROs argue that the
latter process stifles competition by impairing the SROs' ability
to respond to competitive pressures. 13 Because ECNs do not
submit their trading rules to the Commission for approval, they
may have a competitive advantage over registered securities
exchanges. Thus, we are exploring ways to streamline our
exchange regulation in a fashion that will allow market
innovation, but at the same time not sacrifice market integrity or
investor protection. Specifically, we are considering allowing
most trading rules proposed by exchanges to become effective
immediately upon filing with the Commission. This option
would be conditioned on the exchange having established
procedures for the effective surveillance and enforcement of
these trading rules.
II. ORDER INTERACTION
Despite the numerous beneficial effects of market center
competition, problems such as excessively fragmented markets
can result in reduced opportunity for order interaction. The
11 See Mara Der Hovanesian & Emily Thornton, Tough Times in Electronic
Trading, BUS. WK., Oct. 23, 2000, at 142 (reporting that ECNs handle a third of
NASDAQ trades).
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994); David A. Kessler, Investor Casualties in the War
for Market Efficiency, 9 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 1307, 1322 (1996) (stating SROs may
fine, suspend or expel members); Sloan v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 489 F.2d 1, 4 (2d
Cir. 1973) (concluding Congress clearly intended that the Exchange Act function as
a self regulatory body and that appellants knowingly and intelligently subject
themselves to SRO disciplinary procedures). SROs also reserve the right to inspect
and examine the books and records of their members. See NATL ASSOC. OF
SECURITIEs DEALERS, INC., MANUAL 3142.
13 See Richard G. Ketchum & Beth E. Weimer, Symposium: Market 2000 and
the NASDAQ Stock Market, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 559, 573-74 (1994) (stating "record
keeping requirements... continue to place the self-regulatory organizations at a
tremendous disadvantage," and observing that while a proprietary trading system
may make changes quickly in response to customer demands and market conditions,
it takes SROs "operating through the rule filing process months or years to
accomplish" the same thing).
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Commission has taken action in the past to promote the
opportunity for investor orders to interact without the
participation of a dealer. 14 It may seem inconceivable today, but
up through the early 1990s NASDAQ market makers routinely
traded ahead of public limit orders. 15 As a result, it was nearly
impossible for individual investors to use limit orders effectively
in the NASDAQ market. Market makers accepted the limit
orders of customers, but generally did not execute them until
they had become marketable, and were therefore substantially
equivalent to a market order. This effectively denied the
opportunity for individual investor limit orders to compete with
dealer quotations. To address this problem, and at the
Commission's strong urging, the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD"), in 1995, changed its rules to
prohibit a market maker from trading ahead of its customer
limit orders. 16
One year later, the Commission took the further step of
adopting the Order Handling Rules.17 Until then, the national
best bid and offer ("NBBO") for NASDAQ securities generally
reflected only market maker quotations. Such quotations did not
reflect limit orders of any kind, whether submitted by investors
to market makers or submitted by market makers or investors to
ECN limit order books, even when these orders would improve
the NBBO. In addition, the ECNs with the best prices did not
make their prices publicly available in the consolidated
quotation stream, but generally granted access only to their
subscribers.
14 See Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices, 65 Fed. Reg. 75,416
(Dec. 1, 2000).
15 See Ketchum & Weimer, supra note 13, at 560. "The American Stock
Exchange (AMEX) and the regional exchanges... criticiz[ed] a limited disclosure
exception that permit[ed] market makers to trade ahead of customer limit orders."
Id; see also Self-Regulatory Organizations, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,842 (March 8, 1994)
(proposing elimination of the disclosure safe harbor for firms that trade ahead of
their customer limit orders); In Re E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No.
25,887, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) g 84,303, at 89,326
(July 6, 1988).
16 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., supra note 12, at
4121-22.
17 See Order Execution Obligations, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,290 (Sept. 6, 1996) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 240) (requiring, inter alia, inclusion in the consolidated
national best bid and offer (NBBO) of limit order prices and sizes that improved the
market for a security by either improving the price of the NBBO or adding
significant depth to the NBBO).
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To remedy these practices, the Commission exercised its
National Market System authority to require market makers to
include in their quotes (or send to ECNs) customer limit orders
that improve a market maker's published quotations.'8 The
Commission also required market makers to publish their best-
displayed prices either in their quote or through an ECN.19
This past February, the Commission issued its much-
anticipated Concept Release on Market Fragmentation, which
was published together with the notice of the NYSE's proposed
rescission of Rule 390.20 This provided an appropriate context
for the Fragmentation Concept Release because of concerns
about the potential for increased fragmentation of trading
interest once NYSE members were permitted to conduct
transactions in all listed securities off an exchange.
The Fragmentation Concept Release requested the public's
views on whether fragmentation is now, or may become in the
future, a problem that significantly detracts from the fairness
and efficiency of the U.S. capital markets. For instance, certain
broker-dealer practices-such as internalization and payment
for order flow-may substantially reduce the opportunity for
investor orders to interact, which is the effect of fragmentation.
To assist conmenters in formulating their views, the
Commission briefly described six potential options to address
fragmentation, ranging from increased disclosure of order
routing and execution practices to the establishment of a
national market linkage system to mandate price/time priority
for all displayed trading interest.
While the comments reflected a wide range of views on these
issues, many commenters expressed serious concern about
market fragmentation in general, and internalization and
payment for order flow practices in particular.21  Most
commenters expressed support for the idea of increased
disclosure of order routing and execution practices, and the
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. to Rescind Exchange Rule 390; Commission Request for Comment on
Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577 (Feb. 28, 2000).
21 See Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices, 65 Fed. Reg.
48,347, at 48,407 (Aug. 8, 2000). "Many commenters [sic], especially institutional
investors, expressed serious concern about market fragmentation in general and
internalization and payment for order flow practices in particular." Id.
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Commission agreed that there was a need for improved
disclosure in this area. 22 Accordingly, the Commission proposed
two rules to improve public disclosure of order routing and
execution practices. Under the proposed Order Execution
Quality Rule 23 (Rule llAcl-5), market centers that trade
national market system securities would be required to make
available to the public monthly electronic reports that include
uniform statistical measures of execution quality on a security-
by-security basis. These measures include price improvement
and disimprovement, speed of execution, and limit order fill
rates. Under the proposed Order Routing Disclosure Rule24
(Rule 1lAcl-6), broker-dealers that route orders in equity and
option securities on behalf of customers would be required to
make publicly available quarterly reports that describe their
order routing practices and disclose the venues to which
customer orders are routed for execution. By enhancing
disclosure of order routing and execution practices, the proposed
rules are intended to promote fair and vigorous competition
among broker-dealers and among market centers, and permit
customers, other market participants, analysts, and academics
to evaluate their performance in this critical, but previously
opaque, area of customer service.
These proposed rules, admittedly, do not directly confront
the issue of market fragmentation. As it turns out, the more
aggressive options proposed in the Concept Release that would
have dealt directly with fragmentation proved the most
controversial. While many commenters supported a nationwide
system of price/time priority,25 many others believed that such a
system would have an overall negative impact because it would
impair the ability of market centers to compete. 26 After carefully
considering the comments, the Commission elected not to take
action at the time on the price/time priority alternatives
described in the Fragmentation Concept Release. Among other
things, the Commission was concerned about possible
operational and technological problems that might arise if it
were to mandate price/time priority at that time, as well as the
22 See id. at 48,409.
23 See supra, note 17, at 48,291-93.
24 See supra, note 22.
2 See id.
26 See id. at 48,407.
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unpredictable impact decimalization and new technologies would
have on market structure.
The Commission, for these reasons, elected to proceed in a
measured way and gather additional evidence before proposing
more sweeping changes. This should not be interpreted,
however, as a broad retrenchment by the Commission on the
issue of market fragmentation. The Commission remains deeply
concerned about the potential for internalization and payment
for order flow arrangements to interfere with order interaction
and discourage the display of aggressively-priced quotations. To
more fully evaluate these concerns, the Commission's Office of
Economic Analysis is currently conducting an in-depth study of
trading in NASDAQ and NYSE equities to assess order
execution quality. The Commission intends to use the results of
this study, as well as its experience with changing market
conditions, to determine whether further steps are necessary to
address internalization and payment for order flow.
Finally, the Commission is considering further ways to
strengthen price competition and price priority within the
existing market structures. With respect to strengthening price
competition in the quote, the Commission intends to carefully
consider and discuss with the SROs whether in a decimal
trading environment market makers and similarly situated
market participants should be able to step ahead of limit orders
by as little as a penny without previously quoting at that price.
It also is committed to resolving the remaining issues hindering
the inclusion of all ECN prices in the public quote for listed
equities, including the treatment of access fees charged by ECNs
to their non-subscribers.
With respect to strengthening price priority, the
Commission believes that it is important to encourage price
priority across markets, particularly as new sources of quotes
emerge and order routing technology improves. One possibility
for doing so would be to adopt a rule for the equity markets
requiring a broker-dealer to disclose to a customer whenever
that customer's order traded at a worse price than the NBBO. A
similar trade-through disclosure rule has been proposed for the
options markets, which I'll discuss in a few minutes.
2001]
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III. PRICE TRANSPARENCY AND LINKAGES (EFFICIENT
AND BEST EXECUTION)
Price transparency is another key pillar of the National
Market System identified by Congress.27 It formed the initial
focus of Commission action in 1975. The wide availability to
investors of an NBBO and a consolidated stream of transaction
reports from all the market centers that trade a security is a
minimum essential element of a truly National Market System.
To achieve the price transparency objective, the Commission
adopted rules requiring that all market centers make their basic
quotation and transaction information publicly available, that
such information be consolidated, and that it be made available
to investors on a real-time basis.28 As a result, investors have
ready access to an NBBO and a consolidated transaction stream
for each of the thousands of equity securities actively traded in
the U.S. markets. Price transparency has become the hallmark
of our securities markets, and many market participants credit it
for much of their success over the last 25 years.
The fundamental objective of price transparency-assuring
that investors have ready access to high-quality consolidated
data-remains just as important today as it was 25 years ago.
Some, however, have questioned whether the arrangements that
have been set up to disseminate consolidated data are in need of
updating.29 For example, some suggest that greater competition
could be introduced into the system if we abandoned the model
where a single processor consolidates and distributes the data.
They argue that advancing technology allows for new models for
consolidating and disseminating data. In the months ahead, we
intend to explore whether there are better, more efficient tools
with which to achieve the National Market System objectives-
and we will actively seek private sector input in this analysis.
For example, in July the Commission announced that it is
establishing a federal advisory committee to assist it in
evaluating the public availability of information in the equities
and options markets.3 0 The Advisory Committee on Market
27 See HAZEN, supra note 5.
28 See supra note 21, at 48,408.
29 See HAZEN, supra note 5.
3o See SEC to Establish Advisory Committee on Market Info, SEC NEWS
DIGEST, Issue 2000-141, at 1, available at 2000 SEC News LEXIS 1389 (July 25,
2000).
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Information will have a broad mandate to explore fundamental
matters, such as the benefits of price transparency and
consolidated market information, and practical issues such as
the most effective methods of consolidating market data. The
Committee will be chaired by Dean Joel Seligman, a renowned
scholar on securities regulation, and have approximately twenty-
five members representing a wide range of perspectives,
including investors, markets, broker-dealers, vendors, and other
market participants, as well as the public at large. Our hope is
that the Advisory Committee will be able to forge a consensus on
a range of issues concerning market information, and issue a
written report containing its recommendations to the
Commission by September of next year. This is yet another
example of the Commission thinking "outside the box" of
traditional regulatory approaches. When confronted with
difficult and technical issues, such as those surrounding market
data, the Commission is actively utilizing private sector
expertise to aid in developing possible solutions. We are
optimistic that, with this "team" approach, we will be able to
effectively promote the fundamental principle of price
transparency.
Price transparency alone, however, is not sufficient to
achieve the National Market System objectives. Providing
access for executions against those prices, no matter where they
may have originated in the National Market System, is also
essential to address the objectives of efficiency and best
execution.31 Brokers provide the primary means of access to the
markets. But once a broker has routed an order to a market, a
better price may arise in another market. The Commission,
therefore, has used its regulatory authority to prompt the
securities industry to create intermarket linkages that provide
access between market centers to the best-displayed prices.32
These linkages include the Intermarket Trading System for
listed equities and NASDAQ's National Market Execution
System for NASDAQ securities.
Another challenge is the integration of alternative trading
systems into the quote and linkage mechanisms for listed
securities. This past March, the Commission approved a
31 See supra note 22, at 48,409-10.
32 See id. at 48,408-09.
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proposed rule change by the NASD that will permit ECNs to link
to the listed market through the ITS/CAES linkage.33 Although
additional ECN linkage issues remain, the NASD rule is a
significant step in the right direction. We also expect the
participants in the ITS plan to negotiate in good faith and work
diligently to bring new exchanges into the ITS plan.
Some have suggested that advancing technology has made it
possible for brokers to meet their best execution responsibilities
through direct links with market centers, and intermarket
linkages, such as ITS, are no longer necessary.34 As with the
arrangements for disseminating consolidated data, it is worth
exploring whether there are better, more efficient tools with
which to achieve the National Market System objectives. It is
critically important, however, that the objectives themselves are
not impaired in the process.
With respect to the options markets, only last year did they
begin the multiple trading of options in earnest.35 This allowed
options investors, for the first time, to reap the benefits of a truly
National Market System with competing market centers. But
the multiple trading of options raised new best execution
challenges for broker-dealers and significantly increased the
likelihood of intermarket trade-throughs. To alleviate these
concerns, the Commission, last October, ordered the options
exchanges to file a linkage plan.36 But the options exchanges
were unable to agree on a single plan, so they filed three
different linkage plans with the Commission.
33 Order Directing Options Exchanges to Submit an Inter-Market Linkage
Plan, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,674, 57,675 (Oct. 26, 1999).
34 See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MARKET
STRUCTURE, GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP, MARKET STRUCTURE REPORT 41-44
(March 23, 2000), available at http//www.nyse.com/pdfs/marketstructure.pdf (last
visited Feb. 22, 2001); Hearing on the "Financial Marketplace of the Future" Before
the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (2000) (prepared
testimony of Mr. Charles Schwab), available at http://www.senate.gov-banking/00-
02hrg/022900/schwab.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2001).
35 Hearing on "Maintaining Leadership in the Financial Marketplace of the
Future" Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 106th Cong.
(2000) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission), available at http//www.senate.govJ-banking/00-02hrg022900/levitt
.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2001).
36 See Press Release, SEC, Commissioner Orders Options Markets to Develop a
Linkage Plan; Option Exchanges Meet at SEC to Discuss Linkage Plan Process
(Oct. 19, 1999), available at <http://www.sec.gov/news/press/99-137.txt (last visited
Feb. 22, 2001).
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This past July, after reviewing the comment letters
submitted in response to the linkage plans-which reflected a
wide range of views-the Commission took an approach to the
problem of options market linkages that I believe is
revolutionary in its flexibility.37 The Commission refrained from
mandating one single form of linkage, which might fail to adapt
over time to changes in the markets or technological
developments, and might impede the entry of new participants
with different business models. Instead, it took a flexible,
market-based approach to achieve its goal of reducing
intermarket trade-throughs and encouraging effective linkages.
The Commission's approach consisted of three parts. First,
it approved the linkage plan proposed by the AMEX, CBOE, and
ISE but did not order the options exchanges to participate in it.38
Second, to enable customers to better assess the quality of the
executions that they receive, the Commission proposed a trade-
through disclosure rule for the options markets. 39  That
disclosure rule, however, would not apply to transactions in an
options market that participates in a linkage plan approved by
the Commission that contains provisions reasonably designed to
limit trade-throughs. Finally, to ensure that quotes would be
honored when orders are routed to them from other markets, the
Commission proposed a rule that would require options markets'
quotes to be firm up to their published quotation size.40
This flexible approach was designed to encourage access to,
and linkage among, the competing options markets, without
mandating the means to achieve this goal. The industry, as a
result, should be able to readily improve the "plumbing"'--the
means of achieving the national market system goals-as
technological developments and changing market conditions
warrant.
CONCLUSION
What general principles, then, can be extracted from these
37 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves Options Intermarket Linkage Plan
(July 25, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2000-101.txt (last visited
Feb. 22, 2000).
38 See Order Approving Options Intermarket Linkage Plan, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,023
(Aug. 4, 2000).
39 See id. at 48,029.
40 See supra note 33.
2001]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
examples of Commission action to further National Market
System objectives? First, the Commission has been reluctant to
impose specific components for the facilities and systems of the
National Market System. Instead, it has focused whenever
possible on enhancing the opportunity for competition,
particularly competition by innovative market centers and by
investor limit orders. When required to act, the Commission has
eliminated practices that detract from National Market System
objectives, or set necessary market wide standards, while
preserving maximum flexibility for the markets to design,
implement, and govern any needed facilities or systems.
Second, the interests of investors are preeminent to those of
any individual market center or its participants. The secondary
securities markets exist to facilitate the transactions of
investors. Investor interests should be protected; investor orders
should receive best execution; and investor orders should have
an opportunity to interact without the participation of a dealer.
Any rules or practices that place the interests of intermediaries
ahead of those of investors are incompatible with the National
Market System mandated by Congress.
Third, the fact that a practice may further the competitive
self-interest of any individual market center or type of market
center is not determinative of whether that practice is consistent
with the National Market System objectives. If such a practice
hampers the efficient execution of transactions, damages price
transparency, interferes with the best execution of investor
orders, or isolates those orders from an opportunity for
meaningful interaction, the practice warrants careful
examination by the Commission to determine whether
competitive forces alone will be sufficient to address its negative
effects. In the past, for example, market centers with the best
prices have attempted to restrict access to those prices, such as
disseminating their quotations only to members or subscribers. 41
Even though this practice may be in the competitive self-interest
of the individual market center, it is directly contrary to the
price transparency objective of the National Market System, as
well as efficient execution of transactions and best execution of
investor orders.
41 See Order Approving Options Intermarket Linkage Plan, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,023
(Aug. 4, 2000).
[Vol.75:15
REMARKS
Finally, there have been times when the collective result of
individual market participants, acting in their own self-interest,
has not been sufficient to address practices that are harmful to
the National Market System and impair investor confidence
(such as dealers trading ahead of, or neglecting to display,
customer limit orders). In these unusual situations, the only
effective course of action is for the Commission to exercise its
regulatory authority to adopt uniform "rules of the road" that
benefit the National Market System as a whole.42 By adopting or
by encouraging self-regulatory organizations to adopt rules that
set standards, address the harmful effects of specific practices, or
knock down barriers to competition, the Commission can achieve
benefits for the National Market System that could not be
obtained through any other means.
It's very exciting exploring strange, new, and uncharted
worlds and discovering new possibilities. Fortunately, while we
frequently don't have a map, we do have a mandate that keeps
us on course: maintain fair and orderly markets and protect
investors.
Thank you.
42 See supra note 35.
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